

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

AIR EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
PROVIDING OPERATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

by

John A. Neubauer
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: John A. Neubauer

14 June 1996

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

Paper Directed by
G. W. Jackson, Captain, U.S. Navy
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

E. L. Hardeman 9 May 96
Faculty Adviser Date
Hardeman, E. L. Captain, USN
NSDM Faculty

19960815 018

STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority: N/A			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule: N/A			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Air Expeditionary Forces: Providing Operational Alternatives (U)			
9. Personal Authors: John A. Neubauer, Lt Col, USAF			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 14 June 1996	
12. Page Count: 19			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Air Expeditionary Forces, Power Projection, Operational Reserve, Rapid Deployment			
15. Abstract: Due to the post-Cold War draw down, the U.S. military has withdrawn from many of its overseas bases and the regional CINCs will now have to rely on CONUS based forces earlier and to a greater extent than in the past. The U.S. Air Force developed the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept to provide alternative ways of matching needs with capabilities. Possible AEF employment scenarios include humanitarian relief operations, substitute for a similar capability, rapid crisis response, and air operational reserve. Issues affecting the employment of air expeditionary forces exist and should be addressed during the deliberate planning process. Specifically, generic air expeditionary force packages should be designed to speed force tailoring during crisis planning and to allow realistic peacetime training that is consistent with the CINC's wartime concept of operations.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841- 6461 6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

ABSTRACT

Due to the post-Cold War draw down, the U.S. military has withdrawn from many of its forward bases and the regional CINCs will now have to rely on CONUS based forces earlier and to a greater extent than in the past. Because of this, the Services are focusing on their power projection and expeditionary capabilities. The U.S. Air Force developed the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept to provide the CINCs with another way to match requirements with capabilities in a constrained resource environment. Joint publications define expeditionary force as "an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country." This definition implies that expeditionary forces are tailored to rapidly react with sufficient force to influence events and gain the initiative over a potential enemy. Air expeditionary forces possess unique characteristics that provide the CINCs with alternatives in various scenarios which span the spectrum of conflict. Possible AEF employment scenarios include humanitarian relief operations, substitute for a similar capability, rapid crisis response, and air operational reserve. Operational issues affecting AEF employment include USAF doctrinal resistance to the concept of air operational reserves and functional challenges involving logistics, intelligence, and protection. Many of these issues should be addressed during the deliberate planning process where generic air expeditionary force packages can be designed to meet the CINC's anticipated wartime requirements. During crisis planning, these generic packages would require minimum tailoring. This would facilitate rapid reaction and allow air expeditionary forces to conduct peacetime training which is consistent with the CINC's wartime concept of operations.

AIR EXPEDITIONARY FORCES PROVIDING OPERATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

Here we go again. Another Air Force pilot telling us how the Air Force can do it all. They've been telling us for years they could win wars singlehandedly -- now they're going to tell us they can replace aircraft carriers with "air expeditionary forces."

A Naval War College Student

It seems that all the Services are touting the expeditionary nature of their forces lately. While expeditionary thinking has always been central to the Navy and Marine mindset, the other Services' recent emphasis on power projection is more a result of post-Cold War realities than anything else. As the U.S. military draws down, overseas bases are being closed and the level of permanent American overseas presence is significantly declining. Because a larger proportion of their forces are now stationed stateside, the Air Force and Army have begun to portray their capabilities in terms of rapidly projecting military power from stateside to overseas locations. This power projection capability is particularly important to the regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) since they will now have to rely on CONUS based forces earlier and to a greater extent than in the past.

Recently, the U.S. Air Force deployed an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) to Southwest Asia when scheduling constraints prevented the Navy from stationing an aircraft carrier in the region for several months. Does this imply that air expeditionary forces can serve as a viable replacement for a carrier battle group? Or, is the air expeditionary force concept simply a new adaptation of the old Rapid Deployment Force? The answer to both questions is a *qualified yes*. Although the concept isn't entirely new, air expeditionary forces provide a new way to match requirements with capabilities. And while no one is advocating that land based air forces can or should replace aircraft carriers, air expeditionary forces

possess unique capabilities which, under the right circumstances, can provide the CINCs with viable alternatives.

So, what are these unique capabilities and under what circumstances will they be most useful to the war fighting CINCs? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to examine expeditionary warfare as a concept and develop an understanding of what it means. This done, the utility of air expeditionary forces will be considered from a CINC's perspective in terms of possible employment scenarios. Finally, since new operational concepts generate honest debate among military professionals, some operational issues affecting the employment of air expeditionary forces will be examined.

THE AEF CONCEPT

Joint Pub 1-02 defines expeditionary force as "an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country."¹ The simplicity and brevity of this definition has prompted some authors to expand on it by adding more qualifications. These have included the ability to:

- quickly and easily go where there is no infrastructure and operate on arrival
- deploy and employ tailored/economical forces to accomplish the mission
- be immediately available without reserve mobilization
- be structured for deployability, self-reliance, and self-sustainment
- accept austere living conditions while on deployment
- maintain a small footprint to minimize unintended cultural or political impact
- operate large forces without large base areas
- solve problems with minimal support and only broad guidance²

Some have even gone so far as to define expeditionary warfare as "the application of military force outside the United States short of a regional major contingency." The author of this definition goes further to state that expeditionary warfare should have "limited objectives"

and be conducted "under U.S. command."³ To avoid an exhaustive point-by-point analysis of these definitions, it should suffice to say they provide valuable insights on the subject of expeditionary operations, but seem to have been developed with an eye on excluding other services from waving the expeditionary banner.

What, then, are the salient elements of an expeditionary force? The joint definition is a good place to start, but since the U.S. military will almost always be employed on foreign soil, inferences must be made to make the definition meaningful. The first inference can be drawn from the term, *specific objective*. This term implies that expeditionary force objectives should be clear and achievable in a relatively short period of time. The significance of these limitations in duration and level of commitment becomes important when distinguishing expeditionary forces from those which are forward based. While both types of forces fit the broad joint definition, forces that are permanently based on foreign soil demonstrate a much higher degree of commitment with longer term and more general objectives than expeditionary forces. On the other hand, *specific objective* does not imply that expeditionary operations should have *limited* objectives or be limited to conflicts short of a major regional contingency. Expeditionary forces have been and can be employed in various operations which span the spectrum of conflict.

A second inference can be drawn from the term, *organized armed forces*, which implies that expeditionary forces should be designed and tailored to bring *sufficient* force and firepower to accomplish the mission. In this case, sufficient force should not be interpreted to mean limited force. While the application of force may be limited by availability or political constraints, the definition does not preclude the use of overwhelming force. Finally, an important characteristic of expeditionary forces can be inferred from the root of the word

expeditionary – expeditious, which implies speed and efficiency. Expeditionary forces should, therefore, be able to react quickly with sufficient force to influence events or gain the initiative over a potential enemy.⁴

With these qualifications in mind, then, it is apparent that all the services could field air expeditionary forces. While carrier based air forces are clearly expeditionary, land based air forces possess a similar, but distinctly different, expeditionary nature. The combined speed and range characteristics of land based air forces provide a capability to react quickly to events anywhere in the world from stateside locations. In addition, air expeditionary forces can quickly and easily be tailored to meet the immediate needs of the war fighting CINCs. This flexibility creates options where a wide variety of aircraft, weapons, and cargo may be selected to accomplish specific objectives.

The U.S. military has always deployed overseas though, and the question of whether the AEF concept offers anything new is valid. Under the previous Rapid Deployment Force concept, most Air Force units were earmarked to deploy to specific overseas bases in the event of a crisis or contingency. Often, these bases were already occupied by allied or U.S. forces and squadrons regularly deployed to their designated locations so personnel could familiarize themselves with support facilities and local procedures. The fact that there was an existing infrastructure at these bases reduced the amount of equipment and supplies that squadrons had to take with them. Now, because many of the forward bases have closed, all Air Force units have to be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world with enough built-in support to conduct independent operations and do it in relatively austere conditions.⁵ The AEF concept addresses this need.

The need to operate independently leads to a second area where the AEF concept represents a break with the past. Formerly, Air Force units deployed as squadrons with only one type of aircraft. Because of this, they were rarely able to operate autonomously because they lacked the various mutually supporting capabilities needed to effectively employ. This meant that other units would separately deploy air refueling tankers, air-to-air fighters, and aircraft for suppression of enemy air defenses to provide the needed capabilities. In addition, command and control, early warning, and surveillance aircraft would deploy to support air operations. The ad hoc manner in which these forces were combined resulted in logistical inefficiencies and made it difficult to integrate the capabilities of deployed units. The creation of Air Force composite wings addressed these issues by creating a permanent organizational structure for integrating the operations of different aircraft. An AEF is structured similar to a composite wing but is usually organized at a subordinate level.

For example, a typical AEF would consist of twelve air-to-air fighters, twelve air-to-ground fighters, six electronic combat aircraft for suppression of enemy air defenses, and six bombers. For totally autonomous operations, airborne warning and control, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft could also be deployed. If humanitarian relief or long range missions are required, tactical airlift or air refueling aircraft could be added. When forces are already in-theater, an AEF, rather than operating autonomously, would augment and work in conjunction with those forces.⁶ The point is that the actual mix of aircraft would be specifically tailored depending on the CINC's needs at the time. It is also important to note that an AEF could include aircraft from more than one service – an event which is becoming more likely due to the recent agreement between the Air Force and Navy to jointly rely on EA-6B electronic combat squadrons.

POTENTIAL AEF EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS

Having established a conceptual foundation for air expeditionary forces, the next logical step is to examine illustrative scenarios of how and when a CINC would likely employ an AEF. Four general categories emerge which include humanitarian relief operations, substitute for a similar capability, rapid crisis response, and air operational reserve.⁷

Humanitarian relief is not a new mission for air forces and does not warrant a great deal of attention even though it is the most likely scenario. When unopposed, it is the least demanding of the four categories, and when opposed, AEF considerations will be similar to those faced during crisis response. The point is that air expeditionary forces are uniquely capable of accomplishing this mission because they provide a wide range of options to respond to disasters anywhere in the world. Moreover, since humanitarian relief oriented supplies are rarely prepositioned or forward based, only air forces can respond rapidly with the right cargo. Obviously, aircraft capacities will limit the amount of cargo that can be airlifted and long term relief would be more efficiently moved by land or sea, if possible. However, air delivered supplies would provide the initial and most critical relief until a land/sea bridge could be established.

An AEF may also be a viable substitute for a similar capability which has become unavailable for one reason or another. A recent example of this situation occurred during SOUTHERN WATCH, the ongoing air occupation of southern Iraq. Due to cutbacks, the United States now has only twelve aircraft carriers and continuous coverage of the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf is not possible.⁸ Because of this, the Navy could not provide carrier coverage in the Arabian Gulf for several months in 1996 and CINCCENT requested an AEF to make up the difference. This first ever AEF, composed of

eighteen F-16 aircraft, deployed to Bahrain and was replaced a few months later by a tailored package of F-16, F-15, and KC-135 aircraft which deployed to Jordan.⁹ In both cases, the AEF augmented other forces in the theater and the CINC was able to compensate for the temporary loss of carrier capability.

Even if a carrier battle group is available, there are times when the deployment of an AEF may be more appropriate. One case is where a particular area of concern is not within range of carrier based air forces. While most areas of interest to the United States are accessible by carrier based air, American interests change over time and it is possible that a future area of concern would be out of reach of naval air forces. An AEF could provide a substitute air presence in these locations. Another case where it may be more appropriate to send an AEF is when the United States wants to send a stronger signal of resolve. While a carrier battle group allows the positioning of significant military capability close to an area of concern with little risk and political cost, the fact that the battle group is off-shore and out of sight of the populace can dilute the amount influence achieved. This may be exactly what is needed in a "walk softly but carry a big stick" scenario. On the other hand, when the "stick" needs to visibly brandished, the actual presence of U.S. forces on foreign soil sends a strong and unmistakable signal of resolve and an AEF may be a better answer.¹⁰

The most demanding scenario is rapid crisis response and variations in this category are limitless. However, the requirement to deploy air expeditionary forces for rapid crisis response would generally result from a state of heightened tensions or an overt act of aggression. In the case of heightened tensions, the discussion in the previous paragraph on the relative merits of land and sea based forces in a presence role applies. The idea is to

provide the regional CINCs with a range of options to react rapidly, demonstrate resolve, and deter the outbreak of open hostilities.

When the United States chooses to militarily oppose overt aggression in a region where there is little or no forward basing, the first American forces to arrive on-scene will have three functions -- secure a base of operations in-theater, blunt enemy progress, and establish an air/sea bridge to support the transport of follow-on forces if needed.¹¹ Whether the first forces in-theater are land or sea based is relatively unimportant and highly dependent on early intelligence indicators. If a carrier battle group is in the vicinity, naval forces would likely be first on-scene but depending on where they were positioned, it could be several days before they arrive. CONUS based bombers could conduct initial attacks on enemy positions within hours and the first elements of an AEF could be in-place and, in most cases, be operating within a day and a half of notification.¹²

The task during crisis response really boils down to marshaling sufficient force in time to blunt an enemy attack. An aircraft carrier with a normal complement of 36 aircraft can surge 130 fighter/attack sorties for one day and sustain an average of 72 sorties per day assuming underway replenishment. A typical AEF with 36 aircraft can sustain roughly the same numbers of sorties.¹³ In any case, reduced force structure levels and limited sortie production capabilities make it likely that a combination of both types of forces would be required to conduct an effective initial defense against a substantial ground force.

How, then, would an AEF deploy its forces quickly to blunt an enemy attack? If intelligence estimates provide strategic warning, an AEF could be formed and placed on alert where equipment is packed, personnel are processed, and aircraft are configured for deployment to speed the movement of forces. Furthermore, advance warning would provide

additional time to coordinate host nation approval for the establishment of a base of operations. With or without advance warning, when the execute order is given, the heavy bombers assigned to the AEF would go first and, if necessary, attack enemy forces enroute to the deployment base. Other bomber forces could also contribute to slowing the enemy advance by flying missions from their stateside locations to the target area and back. Air Force bomber wings already train for these types of missions which often involve twenty-five to thirty-five hour sorties.¹⁴

Air-to-air aircraft assigned to the AEF would arrive shortly after the bombers to establish local air superiority. After follow-on AEF forces arrive, targeting priorities would focus on the most immediate threat which, in most cases, will be advancing enemy ground forces. Specific AEF objectives at this point would depend on factors such as enemy force levels, distances, and terrain. In some instances, AEF objectives may be limited to delaying an enemy advance until friendly ground forces can be deployed. In other cases, an AEF may be able to independently destroy an enemy force. In either case, the need to directly attack advancing ground forces would compete with the desire to achieve theater air superiority, so air commanders will probably have to operate under conditions where control of the air is temporary and localized. This condition could continue until sufficient forces arrive to achieve a higher state of air superiority.

One final application of air expeditionary forces which emerges after forces are in place and fighting is that of an operational reserve. The function of an operational reserve is to stand ready to rapidly react to either exploit success or to reinforce a position which is threatened. In the first case, it provides a capability to maintain the initiative over an enemy and increases the possibility of inflicting a decisive blow. In the second case, it serves as

insurance against an enemy achieving the same advantages. One could argue that all CONUS based forces theoretically constitute an operational reserve because they can react rapidly to reinforce a threatened position or country.¹⁵ This idea is simplistic and not very useful.

A similar but more practical application occurs in the event the United States has to fight two near simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC) – the scenario that the Department of Defense currently uses for worst case planning. In this situation, the United States and its allies will be hard-pressed to mass enough force to conduct offensive operations in both theaters and will be forced to execute a win-hold-win strategy. This strategy prioritizes efforts whereby the objective is to quickly win the war in one theater while defending in the other and, once the first war is won, shift efforts to winning the war in the second theater. This two MRC scenario, by necessity, has inherent risks associated with timing and the economy of force calculations needed to achieve the objectives in each theater.

In this scenario, planners could hedge against this risk by holding an AEF in reserve, either in the CONUS or at an intermediate forward location. Air Force Reserve and National Guard units are well suited for this role because they generally need additional time to mobilize and are not usually among the first units to deploy. This reserve AEF would be ready to deploy to either theater depending on how the situation unfolds. If an opportunity arises to exploit an unexpected success in either theater, an AEF could strike a decisive blow and expedite the achievement of victory. On the other hand, an AEF could also be used to rapidly reinforce an unanticipated weakness in the war effort. In both cases, commanders will have to make hard decisions regarding timing. If an AEF held in reserve is deployed too soon, commanders may miss better opportunities in the other theater. If it is deployed too late, commanders may give the enemy time to solidify their defenses before the AEF arrives.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Admittedly, the foregoing has been a broad brush portrayal of how and when an AEF could be employed. The intent though, has been to establish a general framework so the issues surrounding the AEF concept can be identified and analyzed. In this respect, several factors will impact the operational employment and effectiveness of air expeditionary forces.

The first issue revolves around the idea of using an AEF as an operational reserve and the possibility that air planners will resist this application. Air Force Colonel John Warden revived the idea of air reserves in his 1988 book, The Air Campaign, and it has since been a subject of debate among air planners. Many airman object to the idea based on the contention that a sortie not flown is lost forever and that commanders should achieve mass by committing all available aircraft to combat. Others assert that the overall concept of reserve forces is land oriented, reactive, and incompatible with the inherently offensive nature of air forces.¹⁶

These objections are seemingly validated by history which may explain why air reserves are not addressed in Air Force doctrine. However, it should be noted that since the advent of military aviation, the United States has not fought a war from a position of industrial or material inferiority. Because of this, war planners always had more aircraft in the pipeline and have never had to hold air forces in reserve to inflict or forestall a decisive blow. Today, long aircraft development and procurement times make this industrial advantage relatively meaningless in a drawn-out large scale war or two MRC scenario. The objections also suffer from a flawed application of the principle of mass. The principle of mass does not mean that commanders should attack with everything they have all the time. Rather, a commander's task is to *mass the right forces at the right time and place* to achieve

an advantage which leads to victory. Finally, while the notion that a sortie not flown is lost forever is true, it is also true that an aircraft which is destroyed is lost forever along with all the sorties it could have flown later. This means it may be smarter to *forego flying a sortie today to avoid losing an aircraft that will be needed later* to achieve mass at the right time and place.¹⁷ Although the concept needs refining, CINCs and their staffs should still consider using an AEF as an operational reserve.

Logistics would also be an issue affecting the employment of an AEF and the most important consideration in this category is the availability of runways. Critics of land based air expeditionary forces continually harp on this need by citing the difficulty and delays in obtaining host nation approval to use existing facilities.¹⁸ This seems like a debatable concern since the United States has never been denied military success because of runway unavailability. Nevertheless, the concern has validity and underscores the need for the CINCs and the State Department to lay out possible scenarios to potential host nations and expend the political capital needed to obtain advance basing agreements in possible hot spots. Forced entry to attain an airfield is also an option and Marine or special forces could accomplish this task. In addition, the Air Force and Army have affiliated two composite wings with airborne and ranger forces which are specifically trained for forced entry and airfield takedown missions. It should be noted that CONUS based, long range bomber sorties avoid the runway issue altogether, but the number of sorties available will be limited because of long mission lengths. In addition, these missions sometimes encounter problems with overflight rights depending on the route of flight. Again, preplanning by the CINCs and diplomats in this respect will be crucial.

The supply aspect of logistics also creates challenges which will normally be addressed by strategic prepositioning and airlift in the early stages of a crisis. Prepositioning doesn't solve all the problems, however, since land based locations for these stockpiles are getting harder to acquire. Furthermore, downloading and distributing supplies from ships is time consuming and requires port facilities. Scarce airlift assets will also be strained which highlights the need to prioritize cargoes. One way to increase the amount of airlift available for combat units and expedite the transition to combat operations is to perform some supporting functions at CONUS locations during the early stages of conflict. These functions could include theater level command and control (in some cases), certain staff functions, logistics management, and intelligence analysis. Current and improved communications technologies make this possible. While this idea has some inherent drawbacks arising from the lack of personal contact and a heavy reliance on technology, the potential leverage from a logistics and war fighting perspective is too great to for the CINCs to ignore.¹⁹

Another logistics issue arises when Navy aviation units are added to an AEF, a likely event due to the Air Force's reliance on Navy EA-6B electronic combat aircraft. While Air Force and Marine squadrons are structured to deploy to locations with little infrastructure, most Navy squadrons depend on maintenance and personnel support assets on the carrier. As a result, their ability to deploy and operate from austere land based locations is limited.²⁰ This problem is not overwhelming, though, and could be resolved with minor modifications to the Navy's maintenance support process and additional equipment procurement. It should be considered a readiness matter and given appropriate priority by the Navy.

Intelligence support is another function that will be critical to initial AEF effectiveness. The United States is unlikely to have the luxury of a DESERT STORM type

build-up in the next conflict. The CINCs and their staffs need to be constantly "in-tune" with the situation in their respective theaters and intelligence agencies need to sound the warning early enough so that an AEF can be tailored and rapidly deployed when the National Command Authority issues an execute order. In order to fight effectively shortly after arrival, deploying forces will need accurate intelligence to provide situational awareness. Intelligence gathering and command and control platforms including airborne warning and control, joint surveillance and target attack system (JSTARS), and reconnaissance assets will also need to be immediately available to support AEF operations especially in the initial stages of a conflict.²¹

Protection of deployed AEF forces is intertwined with the preceding issues of airfield location, logistics, and intelligence. AEF airfields must be located close enough to enemy forces so they are within practical ranges of strike aircraft but far enough away to avoid being threatened by enemy ground forces. AEF air-to-air fighters could adequately defend against an enemy air threat, but if a surface-to-surface missile threat exists, ground missile defense systems would have to be airlifted along with the AEF. Airborne and ground based warning and control systems would also serve an important function in these missions and would have to be on station around the clock. Efficiencies could be gained if the airfield is close to a coastline where AEF operations can be integrated with carrier operations and defenses can be incorporated under the umbrella of fleet self-defense systems. The integration of ground and naval based defense systems will create challenges and is an issue that needs attention. The U.S. Navy's recent doctrinal shift toward littoral operations should serve as an additional impetus for addressing this need.

CONCLUSION

Instead of relying on existing plans, the U.S. national leadership has developed the habit of requesting that the military develop ad hoc alternatives which provide a graduated range of responses during crisis planning. Air expeditionary forces provide the CINCs with another alternative in these types of situations – an alternative that is flexible enough to be applied in a number of ways and under varying political conditions. To avoid the problems sometimes associated with this kind of crisis planning, the air expeditionary force concept should be refined and incorporated into the CINC's operational plans during the deliberate planning process. This would help resolve some of the issues affecting operational functions such as logistics, command and control, intelligence, and protection. Furthermore, the development of generic air expeditionary force packages during deliberate planning would provide a basic structure to be used as a starting point when air expeditionary forces need to be tailored during crisis planning. In addition to reducing reaction time during a crisis, the development of generic air expeditionary force packages would facilitate realistic training that is consistent with the CINC's anticipated wartime concept of operations.

The war fighting CINCs are now operating in a world with fewer resources at their disposal and it is essential that the Services develop new ways to work together and back each other up. Some may see the AEF concept as an attempt to pit land based air forces against aircraft carriers or an effort to replot roles and missions ground. On the contrary, the AEF concept merely represents a step in the evolutionary process of adapting military capabilities to requirements with fewer resources. It also creates a structure for increased inter-service cooperation and could serve as a catalyst for better operational planning.

ENDNOTES

¹ Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (23 March 1994), p. 137.

² Charles E. Wilhelm, Lt Gen, USMC, "Expeditionary Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1995, pp. 28-30.

³ Jack A. Federoff, Lt Cdr, USNR and Melhuish, Christopher A., Lt Cdr, USN, Expeditionary Warfare and Conflict Deterrence, NWC Paper, November 1994, p. 5.

⁴ HQ USAF/XOXS Briefing Outline, "The USAF and Expeditionary Warfare," 26 March 1996, Slide 2. The slide has six bullets: 1) Clear Objective, 2) Relatively Limited Duration/Commitment, 3) Deployed, 4) Sufficient Firepower, 5) Establish Initiative, 6) Lead Echelon. The implications and inferences in the paragraph are views of the author.

⁵ James W. Canan, "Airpower From Home Base," Air Force Magazine, June 1994, P.24-25.

⁶ USCENAF Briefing Outline, "Airpower Expeditionary Force," March 1996, Slide 5.

⁷ Ibid., Slide 5. Humanitarian relief operations, substitute for a similar capability, and rapid crisis response are addressed in the briefing. The application of an AEF as an air operational reserve is a view of the author.

⁸ John Christenson, Cdr, USN, "Nothing Can Match Carrier Presence," Defense News, 26 February 1996, pp. 18.

⁹ Julie Bird, "Fighters, Tankers Get Jordan Job," Air Force Times, 18 March 1996, p. 4.

¹⁰ Bud Jones, Major, USAF, "The Objective is Influence, not Presence or Its Influence (not Presence) Stupid!" CADRE Air Chronicles, (WWW.CDSAR.AF.MIL) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, undated, p. 1.

¹¹ Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, "The State of the Air Force," (Excerpt from the "Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1994," in the *Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress*; Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1995) Airpower Journal, Spring 1995, p. 11.

¹² James W. Canan, "Airpower From Home Base," Air Force Magazine, June 1994, P.26. The Air Force keeps about one third of its squadrons on 24 hour alert status where they would depart for a deployed location within 24 hours of receiving orders to deploy. The squadron would immediately deploy some of its aircrew and aircraft crew chiefs on transport aircraft so they would arrive at the deployed location and be rested when the aircraft arrive. The aircraft would deploy with air-to-air missiles on board so that they would only require refueling after arrival before being ready to fly. When the aircraft are ready, the prepositioned pilots would man the aircraft. A "fast action support team" would deploy with the aircrew and crew chiefs. The team would include communication experts, civil engineers, transportation specialists, food service personnel, and others to set up the support infrastructure.

¹³ USCENAF Briefing Outline, Airpower Expeditionary Force, March 1996.

¹⁴ James W. Canan, "Airpower From Home Base," Air Force Magazine, June 1994, P. 23.

¹⁵ Phillip S. Meilinger, Col, USAF, "Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower," CADRE Air Chronicles, (WWW.CDSAR.AF.MIL) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, undated, p. 4.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁷ Timothy G. Murphy, Lt Col, USAF, "A Critique of *The Air Campaign*," Airpower Journal, Spring 1994, p. 65.

¹⁸ Robert M. Johnston, Col, USAF, "Response to Admiral Boorda's Remarks Regarding US Navy Unwillingness to Sacrifice Functions to Attain Efficiency," CADRE Air Chronicles, (WWW.CDSAR.AF.MIL) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, undated, p. 1.

¹⁹ L.D. Holder, Maj Gen, USA, "Offensive Tactical Operations," Military Review, December 1993, p. 53. MG Holder states that this idea is promoted in FM 100-5.

²⁰ Interview with U.S. Navy Commander David B. Woods, who was the Readiness Officer for the Commander Electronic Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Whidbey Island, WA, 3 May 1996.

²¹ James W. Canan, "Airpower From Home Base," Air Force Magazine, June 1994, P.25.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bird, Julie. "Fighters, Tankers Get Jordan Job." Air Force Times, 18 March 1996, p. 4.
- Canan, James W. "Airpower From Home Base." Air Force Magazine, June 1994, pp. 20-26.
- Christenson, John, Cdr, USN. "Nothing Can Match Carrier Presence." Defense News, 26 February 1996, pp. 19-20.
- Federoff, Jack A., Lt Cdr, USNR and Melhuish, Christopher A., Lt Cdr, USN. "Expeditionary Warfare and Conflict Deterrence." Naval War College Research Paper, 8 Nov 94.
- Headquarters Air Force/XOXS Briefing Outline. "The USAF and Expeditionary Warfare," 26 March 1996.
- Holder, L.D. MG, USA. "Offensive Tactical Operations." Military Review, December 1993, pp. 48-56.
- Johnston, Robert M., Col, USAF. "Response to Admiral Boorda's Remarks Regarding US Navy Unwillingness to Sacrifice Functions to Attain Efficiency," CADRE Air Chronicles, (WWW.CDSAR.AF.MIL) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, undated.
- Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994.
- Jones, Bud, Major, USAF, "The Objective is Influence, not Presence or Its Influence (not Presence) Stupid!" CADRE Air Chronicles, (WWW.CDSAR.AF.MIL) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, undated, p. 1.
- Meilinger, Phillip S., Col, USAF. "Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower." CADRE Air Chronicles, (WWW.CDSAR.AF.MIL) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, undated.
- Murphy, Timothy G., Lt Col, USAF. "A Critique of *The Air Campaign*." Airpower Journal, Spring 1994, pp. 63-74.
- USCENTAF Briefing Outline, "Airpower Expeditionary Force," March 1996.
- Widnall, Sheila E., Secretary of the Air Force. "The State of the Air Force." Airpower Journal, Spring 95, pp. 4-13. (Excerpt from "Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1994," in the *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*; Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Feb 95).
- Wilhelm, Charles E., LTG, USMC, Expeditionary Warfare, Marine Corps Gazette, June 1995, pp. 28-30.